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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. R
298-30 l. The District Court correctly found that Appellant James Newman raised sufficient
issues of fact to establish deficient performance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.

(1984 ). R 293. However, the District Court erred in concluding that

Mr. Newman had not raised a factual issue that "there is a reasonable probability, that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id.,

quoting 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. R 262-296.
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts

In 2004, Mr. Newman was convicted following a jury trial of burglary, I.C. § 18-1401;
robbery, I.C. §§ 18-6501, 18-6502, and 18-6503; battery with intent to commit a serious felony,
LC. §§ 18-903(b) and 18-911; grand theft (two counts), LC. §§ 18-2403(1) and 18-2407(1 )(b );
and first degree kidnaping, LC.§§ 18-4501 and 18-4503. He was sentenced as follows:
Count I, Burglaiy: ten (10) years with five (5) fixed;
Count II, Robbery: life with twenty-five (25) years fixed;
Count III, Battery with Intent to Commit a Serious Felony: fifteen (15) years with
ten (10) fixed;
Count IV, Grand Theft: seven (7) years with three (3) fixed;
Count V, Grand Theft: seven (7) years with three (3) fixed;
Count VI, First

Kidnaping: life with twenty-five years fixed.

The sentences on Counts I, II, IV, and V are concurrent with each other, but consecutive

to a sentence in an unrelated case. The sentences on Counts III and VI are consecutive to all
other sentences. R 263.
According to the Presentence Investigation Report1, M.C. left her home for about fifteen
minutes. When she returned, a man threw a bathrobe over her head and after a short struggle
pulled her into the bedroom and tied a pair of pants around her neck. She could only see his
shoes and the floor. The intruder asked where her husband's guns were and after he shook her
and told her not to lie, she told him where they were. The intruder led her to the bathroom where
he bound her hands with her husband's belt. He later replaced the belt with another pair of pants.
He touched her vagina. He also urinated in the sink and mentioned that his daughter had cancer.
At that time, a young grandson, who had been sleeping elsewhere in the house, knocked on the
door. The intruder put clothing over the boy's head and took Ms. C's truck keys. The intruder
told Ms. C not to call the police because another person was in the house and would keep her
quiet. The intruder then left. Several items were found missing from the house. Updated PSI,
2/3/04, pages 1-3.
Ms. C did call the police and said that she suspected Mr. Newman as he had lived next
door until two months prior. Id She believed that she could recognize his voice. Trial Tr. p.
109, In. 2. Mr. Newman was later arrested. Items matching those taken from Ms. C's house
were found in a search of his house. Updated PSI, 2/3/04, pages 1-3. However, even though a
photo lineup was prepared, the police did not ask Ms. C to identify Mr. Newman in the lineup,
because she told the ofiicer that she did not see her attacker and could not identify him. Trial Tr.
394, In. 3-6. Swabs were taken from the sink where the intruder urinated, but the results returned

1

The Presentence Investigation Report is an exhibit on appeal. R 309.
2

negative for urine. R 234. Bags were placed over Mr. Newman's hands upon his an-est with the
intent that his fingernails be trimmed and scraped for DNA analysis. R 30-31.
In his presentence investigation interview, Mr. Newman explained that while he did
participate in the burglary and theft, another person was also in the house and that the other
person, not Mr. Newman, was the person who committed the kidnaping, robbery, and battery
with intent to commit a serious felony. Updated PSI 2/3/04, pages 4-5.
Mr. Newman appealed from his conviction raising the issue that the sentences were
excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision issued June 20, 2005.
State v. Newman, S.Ct. No. 30796, 2006 Unpublished Opinion No. 510. A Petition for Review
was initially granted; however, no reliefresulted. State v. Newman, S.Ct. No. 30796.
Following appeal, Mr. Newman, through counsel John Bujak, filed a timely petition for
post-conviction relief. Mr. Newman sought relief on the grounds that he had been denied his
state and federal constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel. R 6-11. In particular,
trial counsel Van Bishop was ineflective in failing to request and review all discovery material
prior to trial and not issuing subpoenas for key pieces of DNA evidence; in failing to provide Mr.
Newman with copies of the discovery thus precluding him from assisting in his own defense; in
failing to communicate with Mr. Newman; in failing to challenge the admissibility of certain
DNA evidence found in a trash bag linking Mr. Newman to the Coon house; in failing to follow
Mr. Newman's directions in attempting to reach a plea agreement; and in failing to more
aggressively pursue the disqualification of Judge Goff as Mr. Newman had been in a physical
altercation with the Judge's son which may have resulted in bias on the part of the Judge. Mr.
Newman also alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to communicate with
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him which resulted in the failure to pursue potentially successful issues on appeal. R 9-10.
Later, an amended petition raising these same grounds for relief was filed. R 36-42.
Thereafter, the District Court issued a notice of intent to dismiss. The Court stated that
even assuming the truth of Mr. Newman's factual allegations, he had failed to establish a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's inadequate performance, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. R 20.
In response, counsel filed an affidavit from Mr. Newman which set out in detail where
and how trial counsel had failed to investigate, prepare and present Mr. Newman's defense and
how those failures resulted in prejudice. In particular, Mr. Newman pointed to several areas
wherein had counsel pursued, investigated, and presented forensic evidence that his DNA was
not in the sink in the bathroom and that the victim's DNA was not on his hands, the outcome of
the proceedings would have been different because the jury would have found a reasonable doubt
of Mr. Newman's guilt of robbery, battery with intent to commit a serious felony and kidnaping.
Mr. Newman also averred that but for counsel's deficiencies, the case would have been resolved
by a plea bargain. Mr. Newman further averred that counsel's deficiencies resulted in Judge Goff
not being disqualified from the case which further resulted in Mr. Newman receiving a sentence
in excess of what would have otherwise resulted. And, finally, Mr. Newman averred that had
appellate counsel conferred with him, information could have been communicated that would
have resulted in a decision in the appellate court to remand for a new sentencing hearing. R 2935.
Thereafter, Mr. Bujak withdrew as counsel and was replaced by Teresa Hampton. R 64-

68.
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Ms. Hampton filed a response to the Court's notice of intent to dismiss the petition
addressing both the deficiency and the prejudice prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. In the response, counsel argued that the forensic evidence excluding Mr. Newman as the
source of urine in the sink and excluding the victim from any scrapings from Mr. Newman's
hands would have provided significant reasonable doubt, if not shown actual innocence, for the
charged crimes. Counsel requested that the Court grant a contemporaneously filed motion for
discovery to allow testing of the urine and fingernail samples. R 77-80. The response was
accompanied by an affidavit from Mr. Newman stating that upon his arrest fingernail scrapings
were collected and that he had asked trial counsel to pursue DNA testing of the scrapings. R 8586.
The state filed a response to Mr. Newman's response which asserted that Mr. Newman
could not show prejudice because he had admitted that he was involved with the crimes. R 93-

96.
Mr. Newman filed a reply explaining that Ms. C testified that the person who held her
against her will and took jewelry from her was the same person who touched her with bare hands.
Mr. Newman, however, while admitting that he was present at the C home, asserted that he was
not the person who held Ms. C, took her jewelry from her, or touched her. He argued that the
DNA evidence from the fingernail scrapings and the sink would show that he was not the person
who committed the robbery, kidnaping and battery. Mr. Newman argued that counsel was
ineffective in not obtaining and presenting this forensic evidence and in pursing a theory of
complete innocence of all charges rather than innocence of only the charges involving Ms. C. R
121-125.

5

A hearing was held on the notice of intent to dismiss/state's motion for summary
dismissal. R 136. At that hearing, Mr. Newman set out the nature of counsel's deficient
performance and requested discovery so as to be able to establish evidence regarding the state's
DNA collection, testing, plea offers, and trial counsel's representation. Tr. p. 4, ln.12 p. 11, ln.
15.
In response, the state argued that Mr. Newman could not show prejudice because he had
admitted being present at the crimes and therefore would have been convicted as an aider and
abettor. (The state did not offer an explanation of how it would have proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Newman shared the principal's intent in the offenses involving Ms. Coon.) Tr. p.
13, ln. 20-p. 14, ln.
Following that hearing, a second telephonic hearing was held. At that hearing the Court
questioned whether fingernail clippings/scrapings were ever even collected. Mr. Newman argued
that if the clippings/scrapings were never even collected, then trial counsel's development of a
trial strategy based upon them was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial to Mr. Newman. In
the alternative, if the scrapings existed, the failure to obtain independent testing was
unreasonable and prejudicial. Tr. 33, In. 24 - p. 35, In. 25.
Thereafter, the Court issued an order permitting Mr. Newman discovery relating to
fingernail clippings/scrapings, forensic testing on the same and the results of that testing, and
allowing a deposition of trial counsel. R 149-151.
Then, on April 30, 2009, Mr. Bujak, who was now the Canyon County prosecuting
attorney, filed a petition for appointment of a special prosecutor. R 155.
The matter was set for an evidentiary hearing on May 27, 2009. However, on the day
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before that hearing, the state appeared and asked for a continuance. This presented difficulties,
because Mr. Newman's counsel, Teresa Hampton, had accepted a job with the Federal Public
Defender which, once it began, would preclude her from continuing to represent Mr. Newman.
While the Court debated the issue and the fairness of imposing the associated costs on Mr.
Newman, the Court determined to set over the evidentiary hearing. Tr. p. 51, In. 18 - p. 69, In.
19.

New counsel, Kevin Cassidy, appeared for Mr. Newman and a status conference was
held. At that conference, Mr. Cassidy told the Court that the state had responded to
interrogatories about the fingernail evidence by denying that any fingernail trimmings/scrapings
had ever been taken and denying that they now possessed such evidence. Mr. Cassidy pointed to
the police report which stated that Mr. Newman's hands were bagged for purposes of obtaining
samples and that they were waiting for new trimmers to be secured so as to not contaminate any
evidence and Mr. Newman's affidavit which states that trimmings were taken. Tr. p. 74, In. 14 p. 76, In. 11.

Counsel also requested additional time to determine if Van Bishop's file held any further
information of significance for the motion for summary judgment. Tr. p. 75, In. 12 - p. 76, In. 7.
The matter was set over for a pretrial conference as the Court believed that there would
be some issues that would go to an evidentiary hearing. Tr. p. 77, In. 22 - p. 78, In. 4.
The Court also denied Mr. Newman's motion for attorneys fees against the state which
had been incurred because of its delay in the case. Tr. p. 90, In. 16- 21.
The state then filed a supplemental argument regarding the notice of intent to dismiss.
The state asserted that Mr. Newman had failed to allege sufficient facts to show that had Van
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Bishop done the DNA testing, that the outcome of the trial would have been different. The state
argued that the only way any DNA on the sink swabs would have been useful would have been if
it was found to belong to the other person Mr. Newman said was involved in the crimes;
however, there is no evidence that Mr. Newman had identified the other participant prior to trial.
R234.
The state also argued that Mr. Newman had failed to raise an issue with regard to the
testing of any fingernail scrapings. The state presented several arguments. First, the state argued
that Mr. Newman had not supported his petition with evidence of what results would have been
obtained from such testing and without those results there was not sufficient evidence to raise a
material issue. The state also argued that even if the testing was done and did show none of Ms.
C's DNA on Mr. Newman's hands, there was not a reasonable probability of a different outcome
because Ms. C testified that there was only one participant in the crime, that she recognized Mr.
Newman as that person based on having met him before, and that there was no evidence that the
person who touched the victim could be expected to have her DNA under his fingernails so that
its absence would be exculpatory. R 235.
In his written reply, Mr. Newman argued that Van Bishop discovered for the first time in
trial when he questioned the officer on the stand, that, although Mr. Newman's hands were
bagged, no trimmings or scrapings were ever taken. See Trial Tr. p. 411, In. 7-17. Had Mr.
Bishop known this before he was in the middle of the trial, he could have used this to better
argue to the jury that while the state clearly expected there to be DNA, it failed to follow through
and obtain evidence the could either cinch the identity of the offender or exonerate Mr. Newman.
Further, there remained a question of whether the sink swabs would contain DNA. Counsel
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argued that these issues should be fully litigated in an evidentiary hearing. R 242-244.
Thereafter, a pretrial conference was held. The District Court reiterated its concern
regarding the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel and asked for argument. Tr. p.
95, ln. 4-9. The Court stated, that there were issues of fact concerning deficient performance, but
that an issue had not yet been raised regarding pre:judice. Tr. p. 96, In. 10-15.
A few weeks later, another status conference was held. At that time, Mr. Newman filed a
motion to allow DNA testing of the sink swabs. Tr. p. 109, In. 5-13. In support of the motion,
counsel offered the following argument:
Essentially, Your Honor, in terms of putting on our case and the issue of
prejudice, our position is [that] all along Van Bishop knew that there was DNA
matching James Newman's [tobacco] chew spit that was purported to have been
found at the scene. This was the bag of stuff that was ... according to [M.C.]
found in the bed of their pickup truck.

He knew this infonnation going into trial. And as supported by our affidavit,
Nev.'lllan told Bishop that he was not the only person involved in the burglary and
was not the person who urinated in the bathroom sink with [M.C.J present.
Now, knowing that information, Van Bishop, knowing that the prosecutor had
DNA which linked Newman to the crime scene in this case, he continued with his
theory that James Newman was not present as part of his defense of Newman at
trial, which is patently absurd, especially since Newman told Van Bishop that
another person was present and Newman was found to be in possession of stolen
property and delivered stolen guns to another individual the same day of the
burglary.
So proceeding with a defense that Newman was not present is patently absurd in
light of the facts that the State was clearly going to present at the time of trial.
And Van Bishop was in possession of that information in advance of trial.
The only possible defense that Newman has in this case, Your Honor, would be to
have Newman testify at trial as to the extent of his involvement in the burglary
and the theft and the involvement to the extent that he knew of the other person's
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involvement in the household who was with him during this burglary and theft.
So essentially, Your Honor, it gives us an opp01iunity to corroborate James
Newman's position that he was not the person who was in the bathroom and
therefore, at the very least, couldn't argue at trial that he was not a person - even
though he's guilty of grand theft and burglary, he is not the person who's
responsible for the battery with intent to commit a serious felony or the kidnaping
of [M.C.].
Tr. p. 111, In. 2 - p. 112, In. 20.
The hearing ended with the intent that affidavits would be filed to support the motion for
DNA testing. Tr. p. 124, In. 15- p. 125, In. 15.
About two weeks later, further argument was heard on the motion for DNA testing. At
that time, Mr. Newman withdrew the request for testing. Tr. p. 127, In. 17 - p. 128, In. 15.
Following that, additional argument was offered on the motion for summary judgment.
Mr. Newman again argued the prejudice prong - he argued that Van Bishop knew that the state
had DNA evidence matching Mr. Newman's DNA in chewing tobacco spit which placed him at
the scene. He also knew from Mr. Newman telling him that Mr. Newman had been present at the
scene. The only plausible defense was based in what Mr. Newman had told Mr. Bishop: that he
was present, that he was culpable as to the burglary and grant thefts, but that he was not the
person who committed the robbery, the kidnaping or the battery. Mr. Newman argued that at an
evidentiary hearing he would present testimony that Mr. Bishop knew the underlying facts, did
not put together an appropriate defense, essentially tried the case under an absurd theory, and put
on Mr. Newman's testimony as to what he could have testified to at trial and that this would
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Tr. p. 135, In. 5 - p. 136, In. 24.
Mr. Newman also argued that even if the Court believed that he would still have been
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convicted had Mr. Bishop not presented an absurd defense, he had a plausible defense regarding
the offenses against Ms. C and the Court would have taken that into account in determining an
appropriate sentence. Tr. p. 138, In. 22 p. 139, In. 8.
Thereafter, the District Court entered a written order granting summary dismissal of the
petition. R 262- 296. The Court held that while Mr. Newman had raised sufficient issues of fact
relating to the first prong of Stricklancl, "he ultimately was not able to satisfy the second prong of
the Strickland test concerning any of his claims." R 293 (emphasis original).
In its analysis, the Court identified six areas of potential ineffective assistance of counsel:

1. Urine Samples from Sink:
The Court concluded that failure to test the sink swabs for DNA
did not raise a genuine issue of material fact because Mr. Newman
had not produced admissible expert testimony as to how the
alleged attacker's DNA would be on the swabs when there was no
urine found on the swabs or how any possible DNA would be
linked to an alleged attacker, so as to allow a finding that the
probable outcome of the trial would be different.
Disclosure of a Second Participant/Witness:
The Court stated that Mr. Newman had asserted that he had
disclosed that he was not the only person involved and that
counsel's failure to interview and subpoena that other person was
defective performance and resulted in prejudice because had the
jury heard the testimony of the other person, it would have had a
reasonable doubt as to whether he committed all the charged
crimes. The Court concluded that to support this claim, Mr.
Newman needed to present a cogent statement of what facts would
be testified to relating to the other perpetrator, either through his
affidavit or through the affidavit of a person with knowledge, and
that he had failed to do so.
3. Fingernail Clippings and Scrapings:
The Court stated that Mr. Newman claimed that trial counsel's
II

failure to obtain, prior to trial, test results from fingernail clippings
and scrapings, and the failure to subpoena the results for trial was
defective performance that was prejudicial. The Count concluded
that it does not appear that any forensic testing was ever done by
the state nor had any evidence been proffered by Mr. Newman to
demonstrate what such evidence would have demonstrated.
Further, even if there had not been victim DNA on his hands, the
nature and extent of the other trial evidence was so compelling
that he did not raise any genuine issue of material fact concerning
prejudice.
4. Failure to Provide Discovery:
The Court stated that Mr. Newman asserted that counsel failed to
meet with him and provide him with the discovery hampering his
ability to assist in his defense. The Court concluded that Mr.
Newman had failed to support his allegations with factual
information concerning what evidence would have been introduced
to refute the state's version of events, who would have testified,
and what would have been the substance of the testimony.
5. Failure to Challenge Admissibility of DNA Trash Bag Evidence:
The Court stated that Mr. Newman had argued that counsel was
ineffective in failing to challenge the admissibility of DNA
evidence obtained from a trash bag. The Court concluded that Mr.
Newman had failed to demonstrate what chain of custody issue
existed, that any chain of custody challenge would have been
successful, or that a motion to suppress or motion in limine would
have been successful.
6. Failure to Communicate with Petitioner Concerning Plea Negotiations and
Failure to Follow Petitioner's Directions to Reach a Plea Agreement:
The Court stated that Mr. Newman had argued that trial counsel
was ineffective by failing to plea negotiate effectively. The Court
acknowledged that while the state offered that it was unwilling at
the time of the trial to enter a plea agreement, Mr. Newman
presented the affidavit of his sister that stated that Mr. Bishop had
told her of a plea offer that he did not convey to Mr. Newman
because it was not favorable. The Court then found that even if
Mr. Newman had raised an issue of fact concerning counsel's
performance, he had not supplied admissible evidence to satisfy the
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second prong of Strickland.
7. Failure to More Aggressively Pursue the Disqualification of Judge Goff:
The Court stated that Mr. Newman had argued that trial counsel
was ineffective in failing to aggressively seek disqualification of
Judge Goff in the case. However, the Court, while noting that Mr.
Newman's sentence was affirmed on appeal, held that Mr.
Newman had failed to demonstrate through admissible factual
evidence that there would have been grounds to disqualify Judge
Goff, that he would have imposed a lesser sentence but for the
alleged incident between Mr. Newman and his son, or that another
judge would have given a different sentence.
8. Failure by Appellate Counsel to Communicate with Petitioner:
The Court stated that Mr. Newman had asserted ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. However, the Court held that Mr.
Newman had not identified what issues could have been presented
that were not.
Based upon the above analysis, the Court summarily dismissed Mr. Newman's petition.
R 262-296.
This appeal followed. R 298-301.

III. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the District Court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Newman's petition for postconviction relief given that the petition raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr.
Newman received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial?

IV. ARGUMENT
A. Summary Dismissal Was Improper as the Petition Raised a Genuine Issue of
Material Fact
1. Standard of Review

As set out in Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 880-81, 187 P.3d 1253, I 255-56 (Ct. App.
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2008):
A post-conviction relief action is a civil proceeding in which the applicant bears
the burden to prove the allegations upon which the request for relief is based. An
order for summary disposition of a post-conviction relief application under I.C. §
19-4906(c) is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 56. Therefore, summary dismissal of a post-conviction
application is appropriate only ifthere exists no genuine issue of material fact
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to the requested
relief. If a genuine factual issue is presented an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted. On review of a summary dismissal, we must examine the record to
determine whether the trial court correctly found that there existed no genuine
issue of material fact and that the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. We liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. However, we do not give evidentiary value to mere conclusory
allegations that are unsupported by admissible evidence.

Id, citations omitted.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact.

Booth v. State, No. 37296, Slip Opinion, July 28, 2011, p. 6, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668,698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984). A reviewing court will defer to the district court's
factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but will exercise free review over the
application of the relevant law to those facts. Booth, supra.

2. Argument
The right to counsel in criminal actions is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and by Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Strickland,

supra; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,570,225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). A claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel may be raised in a petition for post-conviction relief. Baxter v. State, 149
Idaho 859,862,243 P.3d 675,678 (Ct. App. 2010). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, the petitioner must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that he
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or she was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland, 466 C.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Booth,
supra.

The District Court found that Mr. Newman had raised a material issue of fact as to
whether counsel's performance was deficient. However, the Court found that a material issue
had not been raised as to the prejudice prong of Strickland This determination, however, was
based upon a parsing of the claims rather than an analysis of the overarching claim that counsel's
deficient performance led him to present an absurd defense to the jury, specifically that Mr.
Newman was not present at the scene of the crimes, and that this absurd defense prejudiced Mr.
Newman insofar as, but for the defense, there was a reasonable probability of a different
outcome. The District Court erred in so parsing the claims. The presentation of an absurd
defense that was contrary to all the existing evidence and contrary to the information given to
counsel by Mr. Newman was deficient performance and Mr. Newman did raise a factual issue
that there was a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,536, 1

2527, 2543 (2003)

(prejudice existed when counsel were not in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice as to
the course of the defense because the investigation supporting their choice was unreasonable).
Mr. Newman presented his affidavit in support of his petition. R

5. In that affidavit,

Mr. Newman set out that he told Mr. Bishop prior to trial about the involvement of the other
perpetrator and that had Mr. Bishop interviewed this perpetrator and had the sink swabs tested, as
well as taken other steps outlined in Mr. NeVvman's affidavit, a reasonable doubt could have been
raised at trial as to whether Mr. Newman was guilty of the robbery, kidnaping, and battery. Id
These allegations were sufficient to raise a material issue as to prejudice. Wiggins, supra;
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v. State, supra. Mr. Newman's affidavit, while not an affidavit from an expert, does set
out that evidence could have been obtained which if presented at trial would have created a
reasonable probability of a different outcome.
In parsing out each bit of evidence, the District Court failed to consider the totality of the
situation. For example, while the failure to have the sink swabs tested standing alone might be
deficient performance, but would not be prejudicial, the ultimate effect of all the various
deficiencies of counsel was to base Mr. Newman's defense upon an absurd theory one
completely inconsistent with the evidence and with Mr. Newman's statements to counsel - that
he was not involved in the charged offenses in any way. The "he's guilty of everything or guilty
of nothing" strategy was prejudicial because it was unsupported by any evidence and was
contrary to all the information trial counsel had. Wiggins, supra. See also, Davis v. State, 116
Idaho 401,406,

P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. l 989)(strategic decisions made on a basis of

inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or other shortcomings may be the basis for a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.)
In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court should not look to each
example of deficient performance independently and detennine whether it was prejudicial.
Instead, the court should consider all the deficient performance and then determine whether the
cumulative effect was prejudicial. See Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520,527,927 P.2d 910,917
(Ct. App. 1996), and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 32, 878 P.2d 198, 206 (Ct. App.1994). As
the Ninth Circuit has explained, "Separate errors by counsel ... should be analyzed together to
see whether their cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance.
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They are, in other words, not separate claims, but rather different aspects of a single claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9 th Cir. 2003).
Mr. Newman did raise a material issue as to whether there is a reasonable probability that
if counsel had listened to him and investigated and presented a defense in accord with the facts as
related by him- that be was guilty of some charges, but not all - the outcome would have been
different. Had a reasonable defense based in the evidence been planned, it is reasonably likely
that the case would have never even gone to trial. While the state may or may not have been
willing to participate in a plea agreement when the defense was total innocent of all charges,
given that there clearly was evidence of guilt as to some charges, the state might very well have
been willing to agree to a guilty plea to the theft and burglary charges in exchange for dismissal
of the other charges where the evidence was more problematic.
Likewise, if the case had nonetheless gone to trial with a reasonable defense based in the
evidence, it is reasonably likely that the jury would have concluded that Ms. C's identification of
Mr. Newman as the man who committed the robbery, kidnaping and battery was not proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, given that she only saw the man's shoes, that she was under extreme
stress at the time, and that Mr. Newman was in the house.
In fact, Ms. C was not even shown the photo lineup because she told the police that she
did not see her attacker and could not identify him. Trial Tr. p. 394, ln. 3-6. At trial, she
testified that even minutes after the attack, when everything was freshest in her mind, she could
not tell the responding officers exactly what had happened. "You know, I tried real hard, but I
was real shook up." Trial Tr. p. 167, In. 21-22. One of the responding officers testified that Ms.
C was so upset that she could not focus on anything except her grandchildren and that it was very
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difficult to talk with her. Trial Tr. p. 386, In. 2-5, 20-24. According to her trial testimony, at the
time she saw the person in her house, in the moments before a robe was put over her head, Ms. C
thought the man was her son or her husband. Trial Tr. p. 180, In. 3-181, In. 1. Indeed, Ms. C was
so upset that she spent the next six weeks locked in her home carrying a loaded pistol from room
to room. Trial Tr. p. 168, In. 12-24.
A jury might well have concluded that the testimony of a witness so upset that she
behaved irrationally for weeks after the event was not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury
might well have concluded that a witness who had such a difficult time focusing on and reporting
the events she witnessed easily could have been confused about how many people were in her
home and who did what. The jury might well have concluded that Ms. C understandably
conflated the two people in the house into the one person she already knew from around the
neighborhood, mistakenly believing that Mr. Newman was the person who committed robbery,
kidnaping and battery, when actually, he was only involved in the thefts and burglary.
And, finally, even if there had been a trial, and a conviction, ifthere had been a
reasonable defense based in the evidence, the District Court might well have taken a different
view of the appropriate sentence. Indeed, at sentencing, the court made a point of telling Mr.
Newman that his sentence was based on "everything" including the trial and his demeanor during
the trial. Tr. 4/16/04, p. 100, In. 9 - 14. Presumably "everything" included the absurd defense
which was inconsistent with the evidence. The absurd defense was prejudicial to Mr. Newman at
sentencing. The sentencing court was clearly imposing a sentence based in part upon retribution
for Mr. Newman not admitting guilt. See Tr. 4/16/04, p. 106, In. 5 -20, "And, so there a - and
the law recognizes that in the retribution aspect of sentencing ... I was watching you like a hawk
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[when Ms. C testified and spoke again at sentencing] ... and I thought at that point, this is
somebody society needs to be protected from until he dies." Had Mr. Newman been able to
admit his guilt to the charges for which he was guilty and go to trial with a reasonable
the other charges, even if

on

had been convicted, the sentencing court would not have imposed

the extreme sentence it did because the lack of remorse and the retribution factors would not
have been the same.
Of course, Mr. Newman did not need to fully prove prejudice to avoid summary
judgment. Summary dismissal is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact
which would, if resolved in the applicant's favor, entitle him to relief. Nevarez, supra. The facts
and reasonable inferences are construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party. Id
Considering the totality of Mr. Newman's claim, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether he was deprived of his state and federal constitutional rights to counsel.
As Justice Bakes observed in State v. Kraft,

The question of competency of counsel is an extremely complex factual
determination which, in all but the most unusual cases, requires an evidentiary
hearing for determination.
96 Idaho 901,906,539 P.2d 254,259 (1975)(Bakes, J. specially concurring).
In this case, as in all but the most unusual cases, an evidentiaiy hearing was required. Mr.
Newman did raise an issue of material fact with regard to the prejudice prong of Strickland and
summary dismissal was inappropriate.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Newman asks this Court to reverse the order of
summary dismissal and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

-
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Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 2011.

{
Deborah Whipple
Attorney for James Ne
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